ECC and DPA
There is a map from affine coordinates to projective coordinates
and a similar reverse one
where s and t are the "weights" of the projective representation.
Randomized Projective Coordinates
Take the affine point P = (x; y)
Map it into a projective representation, using a random r 2 K , (x; y) 7 ,! P 0 = (xr
Then compute
Map Q 0 back into affine the affine form Q. We then consider P 0 as a point on C 0 where if C is given by
Nigel Smart
; and v chosen so as to make C 0 monic in the y. The curves C and C 0 are isomorphic.
In our cryptographic operation we now compute
Then map this back to C via Q = (X;Y ) = (X 0 =r s ; Y 0 =r
Randomized Field Isomorphism
Here we take P 2 C and apply a random field isomorphism κ : K ! K 0 to both P and C so as to obtain
We then compute Special Points Goubin defines a special point P = (x; y) 2 C to be one in which
Goubin's attack works by feeding suitable multiples P 0 , depending on ones guess for a given bit of d, of a special point into the device.
Then when the smart cards computes [d]P 0 , the special point will occur within the computation assuming the guess is correct.
Existence of the special point will be picked up with a DPA trace Special points are preserved under the three randomizations above.
Hence, attack will apply under all three DPA defences above.
Curve Orders
Elliptic curves in cryptography are usually chosen to have order
where q is a large prime h is a small integer called the cofactor.
In practice one usually has h 2 f1;2;3;4;6g.
The values of h correspond to the orders of the small subgroups of E(K).
We say that a special point has small order if it has order dividing h, otherwise we say it has large order. 
Special Point Orders

"Special Points" of Small Order
Goubin's attack can be prevented for Special Points of small order by implementors actually implementing protocols which prevent other well known attacks.
Other Protocols Similar considerations apply to other protocols which have cofactor variants -One pass ECMQV -ECIES, as defined in X9.63 and SECG In these cases we have to alter the order of operations from the standard -This is done without affecting the results -Hence, can be done without affecting other parties
New-ECIES
There is a newer version of ECIES, as proposed in a draft ISO standard A quick look at the new ECIES reveals that the new version processes the cofactor before the secret key multiplication as we recommend, hence the new version is already protected against Goubin's attack for special points of small order.
"Special Points" of Large Order
The existence of special points of large order is due to the equation
We propose to transfer the cryptographic protocol over to an isomorphic group (but not an isomorphic curve) via an isogeny
Note, the curve E 2 and the isogeny we will use are all defined over the base field F p .
Only the isogeny and the isogenous curve itself needs to be stored. They can be precomputed.
Evaluating an Isogeny
To apply the isogeny defence it would be better to alter the standards so that the curves are replaced with isogenous ones.
However, since this is unlikely to be an option the smart card needs to convert the input point to the isogenous curve.
If the isogeny is of degree l we need to evaluate three polynomials of degree 2d + 1, 3d + 1 and d, where d = (l ,1)=2.
Using Horner's rule this implies a maximum number of field multiplications of (2d + 1) + (3d + 1) + d = 6d + 2 3l:
This is low in comparison to other possible defences.
